DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10
[redacted]
Security Information

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

COMMUNIST CHINA

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

SECTION 82

NAVAL FORCES

DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: REVIEWER: 018645

RECORD COPY

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption Category 5B(1), (2), and (3). Declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

JOB NO. 79-00901 A
BOX NO. 1991
FOLDER 1
TOTAL COPIES HEREIN 1

RECORD COPY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

EXEMPT
From Automatic Declassification
Reviewed by CIA Under E. O. 12953 § 3.4
Exemption: 25X _____ Date/Event all
Date: 9/23/98

RECORD COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 82

	Page
A. General	82- 1
B. Organization	82- 2
1. Naval high command	82- 2
2. Naval districts, zones, or activities	82- 3
3. Naval communications network	82- 3
4. Forces afloat	82- 5
5. Other naval organizations	82- 6
C. Strength and disposition	82- 6
1. Ships	82- 6
2. Personnel	82- 8
D. Policy and doctrine	82- 8
1. Naval strategic concepts	82- 8
2. Doctrine	82- 9
3. Naval budget and appropriations	82-10
4. Construction and development programs	82-10
5. Naval relationships with other countries	82-10
6. National attitude toward the Navy	82-11
E. Personnel	82-11
1. Corps, services, ranks, and rates	82-11
2. Personnel procurement	82-11
3. Naval uniforms and insignia	82-12
F. Reserve and mobilization system	82-12
G. Training	82-12
1. General	82-12
2. Training facilities	82-13
3. Training afloat	82-13
H. Logistics	82-13
1. Procurement	82-13
2. New construction, repair and maintenance	82-13
3. Centers of supply	82-14
I. Ship design and characteristics	82-14
1. Design of ships	82-14
2. Strategic characteristics	82-15

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45 333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

	Page
J. Materiel	82 - 15
1. General	82 - 15
2. Materiel characteristics	82 - 15
K. Personalities	82 - 16
L. Tabular data	82 - 17
M. Comments on principal sources	82 - 23

LIST OF FIGURES

			Page
Fig. 82–1	Chart	Possible naval integration into army organization	82 - 3
Fig. 82–2	Map	China coast	82 - 4
Fig. 82–3	Chart	Typical coastal defense command	82 - 5
Fig. 82–4	Table	Training facilities	82 - 13
Fig. 82–5	Table	Strategic characteristics of vessels	82 - 16
Fig. 82–6	Table	Naval guns	82 - 22

This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

82. *Naval Forces*

A. General

The genesis of a Chinese Communist naval force in the late 1940's was a logical outgrowth in keeping with the successes of the People's Liberation Army against the troops of the Kuomintang. As sections of the coastline and portions of the inland waterways came under Communist control, floating equipment and shore facilities left by the Nationalists came into the possession of the new regime. Some Nationalist warships, such as the light cruiser *Chungking*, defected to the Communists, and a considerable number of Nationalist naval personnel also went over to the other side. Thus, when the Chinese Communists gained control of China's maritime regions, they acquired some definite naval responsibilities and a few of the naval assets necessary to meet these new commitments – but certainly not enough of the latter to insure coastal security or to consolidate gains won by the ground armies. Vessels which were needed and could be put into operating condition were utilized independently by Army commanders (Communist) in the immediate campaign at hand; naval coordination was probably at the minimum. With the conclusion of the fighting on the mainland, the remnants of the partial navy acquired from the Nationalists became the nucleus of an organized People's Navy.

As had been the case in other Communist victories, those men who were former members of the defeated regime's military organization, but who had joined forces with the Communists, were utilized in the opening stages of establishing a new service. As events progressed, however, most of these persons were replaced by known Communists. Since the Chinese Communists had no naval background, the only immediate source of such replacements was the corps of Army officers. The highest ranking officers in the present Navy are all men of long experience in the Communist Chinese ground forces. Some junior officers have been turned out by the Communist naval institutions, a few ex-Nationalists remain in minor positions, and Soviet naval advisers literally abound throughout the organization; however, the Chinese Communist Navy continues to get its direction and its character from those Army-trained men who staff the working elements of the naval service.

For all practical purposes, the Navy should be considered as a specialized unit of the Army, on about the same command level as one of the field armies. Chinese Communist military plans apparently call for the Navy to assist the Army in coastal defense and to control all movements of goods and persons across the maritime frontiers. As long as Taiwan and certain of the offshore islands remain in Nationalist hands, the Navy must also stand by for large-scale amphibious operations, although in such assaults the over-all command will lie with the Army.

In terms of orthodox naval vessels, the strength afloat is not impressive. The *Chungking*, the Navy's largest vessel, was bombed by Nationalist aircraft shortly after she defected, and was photographed in 1949 at Hu-lu-tao, sunk on her side in shallow water. Her present status is unknown. Eight ex-Japanese frigates, a corvette, and three gunboats (one a rearmed corvette) comprise the major vessels list of the Chinese Communist Navy. In addition, there are three older gunboats, sixteen river gunboats, four sub-chasers, and at least forty motor torpedo boats. The amphibious fleet includes about fifty landing ships of various categories, with approximately the same number of amphibious types being operated by non-naval agencies and presumably available to the Navy when necessary.

Aside from this rather limited armada, the Chinese Communists also have numerous small craft for patrols of coastal and inland waters. Moreover, the Navy makes use of large numbers of motorized junks – armed and armored and possessing considerable combat potential when employed in force. In view of the Communist's successful Korean minelaying operations, which have been conducted by small powerboats, junks, and even sampans, it can be expected that mine warfare along the China coast will reach formidable proportions in the event of hostilities in that area.

The current estimate of Communist China's naval personnel strength is 25,000 officers and men, plus 30,000 marines. The over-all standard of professional competence is probably quite low in comparison to that of other Far East navies; however, there is an intensive training program underway,

NOTE Chinese Communists military forces are discussed under NIS 39A, and Chinese Nationalist military forces are covered in NIS 39B.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

personnel are compelled to absorb instruction a rapid rate in order to avoid disciplinary asures.

he capabilities of the Chinese Communists in ay of the Western concepts of naval warfare insignificant. In all probability, the eight ates, three gunboats, etc., would not be engaged vessels of their own class, but would be the gets of modern destroyers and cruisers; such al actions would quickly eliminate most of the nese Communist Navy's firepower. The motor pedo boats, if properly employed, could have ie initial successes. If the Navy receives some he small coastal submarines which the Soviets using to train Chinese Communists, these weap- could furnish some assistance in defending portant harbor entrances, etc. In the main, how- r, the Chinese Communist Navy's active de- se of the China coast would be most ineffectual inst strikes by Western navies; passive defense – ding – would be a more serious matter.

nsofar as security police functions are con- ied, the Navy has been very energetic in its rts to preserve the integrity of national mari- e frontiers, and has met with almost complete cess. The Navy's amphibious troop lift ca- ity, utilizing conventional landing ships and ft, has been estimated at 60,000 men; however, en to this basic force is added the rest of China's phibious vessels (from non-naval sources) and vast flotillas of small craft, the total capacity proaches a million men for short-haul opera- ns.

here are no indications that the present naval ation in Communist China will be altered ap- ciably in the near future. Additional motor tor- o boats may be acquired by the fleet, and the nsfer of a few coastal submarines from the iet Navy must be considered as imminent. How- r, the Navy will probably continue in its sub- ient relationship to the Army; it is difficult conceive of the sort of abrupt change in the ernational situation which would call for a pro- nced emphasis on Chinese Communist naval ver.

Organization

. Naval high command

he general lack of knowledge on all phases of nese Communist naval activities is perhaps most nounced in those fields which are not suscep- le to direct observation—even by the partici- nts themselves. Thus far none of the available rces have been able to speak with authority the subject of naval organization. There is an sence of fact on practically all aspects of or- ganization; therefore, only the broadest of as- sumptions have been attempted in this Section.

The one salient point that does arise from a study of existing material is that the Navy appears to have been created primarily as an auxiliary to the ground forces. Within the National Defense Establishment, the Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army is in direct control of all branches of the armed forces. An illustration of the Navy's subordinate role is the occasional appearance in the Communist press of the phrase "the Navy of the People's Liberation Army."

The duties of the Navy also seem to reflect this ancillary capacity. Probably the greatest part of the Navy is devoted to providing services of a maritime nature for the Army. These services apparently fall into two main categories: 1) assisting the field armies in amphibious training and in forming amphibious task forces by providing quartermasters, coxswains, navigators, and ship or boat captains (but not necessarily whole crews) for various troop carriers, and also supplying naval equipment and technical knowledge; or 2) handling similar activities for the military district garrison forces in order to assist them in maintaining coastal and river security. In the actual performance of either of these military tasks it appears that the line of command comes down entirely through Army channels; the Navy is employed in strictly a staff function. A hypothetical illustration of how the Navy may be integrated into the Army organization is given in FIGURE 82–1.

Included in FIGURE 82–1 is a Headquarters, People's Navy, located at Peiping (Pei-p'ing) and serving as the central authority for all naval matters. Some reports have maintained that the Headquarters is merely an administrative center; however, there are other indications that the Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist Navy controls the larger vessels, or the Seagoing Forces, from his Peiping headquarters, exercising direct military command for this purpose. The latter premise is believed the more plausible, and is therefore reflected in the Figure. The Commander in Chief has three principal assistants: the Deputy Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Political Commissar. The billet of Political Commissar is a familiar one in the general structure of Communist military organizations, and the duties of that officer probably coincide with those of similar officers in other Communist navies. The functions of the Deputy Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff cannot be ascertained on the basis of existing information, nor is there a set pattern among other Communist navies which would permit a parallel to be drawn. It can be presumed that there is a staff of specialists at Navy Headquarters who are charged with responsibilities in such fields

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10



FIGURE 82–1. COMMUNIST CHINA, POSSIBLE NAVAL INTEGRATION INTO ARMY ORGANIZATION

as personnel training and logistics, but knowledge of such departments or bureaus is too fragmentary to warrant amplification of this subject.

2. Naval districts, zones, or activities

The Navy parallels the Army and the civil government in its division into districts, or, as they are more commonly translated in this context, areas. In each military area in which there is any appreciable amount of navigable water, there is a subordinated military area naval command. Although there is no complete listing of these naval areas available, a good proportion of the reports on this subject are concerned with the East China Military Area Naval Command (the most important one), which has headquarters in Shanghai (Shang-hai), and the Central and South China Military Area Naval Command, with headquarters probably at Canton (Kuang-chou). In addition, the North China Military Area also has a narrow sea frontage along the Gulf of Chihli (Po Hai); however, it is believed that naval affairs in that region are administered by the East China organization in Shanghai or (possibly) by the Northeast China (Manchuria) Military Area. Chia-mu-ssu, on the Sungari River (Sung-hua Chiang), and Dairen (Ta-lien) have been reported with about equal frequency as headquarters of the latter area. (See FIGURE 82–2.)

Within the areas the organization is presumably divided into districts corresponding to the provinces. The details of the integration of the naval staff function with the Army commands in the lower echelons are in doubt, but it appears that there is a naval staff group connected with each Army command having any naval activities. On this basis, it is possible to present a tentative chart (FIGURE 82–3) of the organization of the Kwangtung Coastal Defense Command of the Kwangtung Military District Command.

3. Naval communications network

In view of the Navy's subordination to Army command, it is logical to assume that Army communication facilities are utilized for traffic between shore stations. Communications with ships at sea are possibly effected through navy-manned radio transmitters along the coast; however, if such installations exist, they are thought to be few in number and suitable for coastal operations only. Some

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45 333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10



FIGURE 82–2. CHINA COAST

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10



FIGURE 82–3. COMMUNIST CHINA, TYPICAL COASTAL DEFENSE COMMAND (TENTATIVE)

communications procedures are very likely handled by mobile transmitters – particularly during amphibious exercises. In addition, maximum usage is probably made of various methods of visual and wired communications, resulting in a relay system, from ship to shore observer to the cognizant military or naval command. Naval Headquarters at Peiping may have its own facilities for direct communications with the forces afloat. Since most of the fleet consists of small vessels which are equipped with receiving gear only (if that), the nonreceipt type of broadcast must be employed whenever possible. Messages which must be acknowledged would have to be handled by a communications guard ship having both receiving and transmitting equipment.

4. Forces afloat

The organization of the Chinese Communist Navy's forces afloat is as nebulous (to the Western observer) as that of the elements ashore. Since it is accepted that 1) the Navy is subordinate to the Army in practically all phases of its operations, and yet 2) there probably is a direct command relationship between the naval Commander in Chief and certain of the larger vessels, it can be concluded that the over-all pattern of responsibilities for naval operations is complex and possibly confusing even to the military and naval commanders themselves. This situation is aggravated by the newness of the Navy; each problem must be attacked as it occurs, without precedent or recourse to history. And, finally, the efforts to organize and administer efficiently are undoubtedly handicapped by such factors as the distances between commands, the state of the communications systems and the priorities accorded to the Navy for their use, and the lack of officers possessing the necessary experience and political stature to solve problems of a local nature at the local level.

The best analysis that can be made of the existing information with regard to the organization of the forces afloat, is that there are three major concentrations of vessels along the coast, which may be termed "fleets," and two or three groups of river craft along the inland waters, which can be labeled "flotillas." The nomenclature used by

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45 337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

Chinese Communists to designate the several upings of naval vessels has not been determined. ps based out of the Canton/Whampoa (Huang- region and associated with the Central and ıth China Military Area Naval Command have n reported variously as the "6th Naval Fleet of Chinese People's Liberation Force," the ople's 6th Naval Fleet," the "1st Naval Fleet the Central and South China Military Area," "United Fleet for Coastal Defense of South na," and perhaps a half-dozen more such titles. ıilar inconsistencies are to be found in reports ling with the other naval forces afloat. In ition to the "fleet" at Canton/Whampoa, prac- ılly all of the larger vessels are currently lo- ed at Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao), and a third group ships is to be found at Shanghai. The Yangtze er (Ch'ang Chiang) is patrolled by a sizeable illa of river gunboats (possibly divided into an ıer Yangtze and a lower Yangtze force), and re are also at least two of these craft on Chu ang (commonly known as the Pearl River), king out of Canton. It has not been deter- ıed whether the river patrols on the Sungari er (Sung-hua Chiang) are carried on by Soviet Chinese Communist forces.

The forces afloat may be further divided into ious units for specific assignments, but delinea- ı must await more complete information.

.s a provisional and partial explanation of the ual management of the naval operating forces, an be reasoned that the Commander in Chief he Navy retains his direct control over certain sels for strategic reasons determined by his mili- y superiors. It may be desirable to hold the ngest vessels of the Chinese Communist Navy ler one authority for the prompt and vigorous cution of a specific task; there may be also idea of maintaining a portion of the Navy free m the control of Army area commanders in order further a naval concept – as an antecedent to establishment of a more autonomous navy. atever the reasons for this situation, it is likely t those vessels which are the Commander in ef's special charge are dependent on the ap- priate Military Area Naval Command for ad- ıistrative services and logistic support.

By far the greatest number of Chinese Com- nist naval vessels are under the control of their pective Military Area Commanders (Army) ough various subordinate commanders, with val personnel handling the necessary staff func- ns at the different echelons (see FIGURE 82–3). .s possible that the river flotillas and the coastal rol forces of motorized junks are even more ıited in their associations with the general naval anization, as local Army commanders are prob- y given a great deal of independence in their utilization of these forces. Within the small vessels in river and coastal patrol service, there is reason to believe that a good proportion of the crew is made up of Army personnel; certainly, this appears to be the case for personnel performing gunnery and communications duties. This mixing of the personnel in a ship's company may also be true, to a lesser extent, in the larger vessels. Presumably, each ship (or group of small craft) has a Political Officer who is responsible for political training and morale in his vessel. There have also been a few reports (unsubstantiated thus far) that the Political Officer in Chinese Communist warships enjoys a status similar to that of the Ship's Commissar of the early Soviet Navy – who could countermand even an order given by the Captain.

5. Other naval organizations

The Chinese Communist military structure includes a number of organizations whose exact duties and responsibilities are not clear, but which appear to be quasi-naval in function. There has been mention of such units as "coastal defense troops," "amphibious troops," "ship control regiments," "customs patrols," and "river defense forces." The extent to which these are variant names for the same organizations and the extent of Navy participation in these activities are not known.

Somewhat firmer are references to the Chinese Communist Marines, which are apparently a sort of naval infantry similar to their Soviet counterpart, and which may include some of the units listed above. These troops are organized into at least five divisions (all detailed to duty along the coast) and include a minimum of 30,000 men. Their position in the command structure of the armed forces is undetermined.

The few rumors concerning a naval air arm and a naval coast artillery are largely discounted; however, it is possible that there has been some planning along these lines.

C. Strength and disposition

1. Ships

The operating forces of the Chinese Communist Navy consist of a motley collection of ships of various designs, national origins, and vintages. The largest naval vessel in the possession of the Chinese Communists is the light cruiser *Chungking* (ex-British *Aurora*). Reports that this vessel, left on her side by Chinese Nationalist Air Force bombing at Hu-lu-tao in 1949, has been towed to Dairen for repairs are unconfirmed. The major operational units of the Chinese Communist Navy are eight ex-Japanese frigates (PF) and two ex-corvettes (one "Castle" Class and one "Flower" Class).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

The most significant recent development in the Chinese Communist Navy has been the creation of a motor torpedo boat force of at least 40 units (others may exist at ports not open to Western observation). Located at Shanghai, Tsingtao, T'ang-ku and Whampoa, most of these PT's are believed to be of Soviet origin; however, some could be ex-United States PT's sold as surplus in the Pacific after World War II. It is even possible that some have been constructed in China. Although there is no evidence to confirm the possession of submarines by the Chinese Communist Navy, it is fairly certain that the Soviets are training selected Chinese personnel in submarine warfare. Some of these trainees may form mixed crews for coastal submarines under Soviet command, and the future transfer of one or more of these units to Chinese Communist control may be considered a strong possibility. The rumored presence in Chinese waters of other Soviet vessels transferred to the Chinese Communists are considered false. A possible exception is that ex-Japanese vessels on the Sungari River (the former Manchukuo Navy) may have been transferred to Communist China by the U.S.S.R.; however, no reliable information has been received on such a transfer.

Until 1952 most of the principal Chinese Communist Navy units were located in the Shanghai area. After a notable absence of these units from Shanghai during the summer of 1952, a total of ten frigates (PF) and gunboats (PG) were sighted at Tsingtao in September 1952. It is not known whether this represents a permanent transfer of these vessels to Tsingtao. In addition, the rumor of the transfer of vessels in the Shanghai area to a base in the Chou-shan Ch'ün-tao (archipelago) awaits confirmation. There have been no indications that Chinese Communist warships are employed in the Dairen – Port Arthur area. The coastal areas of Chekiang (Che-chiang), Fukien (Fu-chien) and Kwangtung (Kuang-tung) provinces support patrol units composed of armed junks and fishing vessels. These patrol units probably operate in extremely small assigned sectors out of very primitive bases. In the Chu Chiang (or Pearl River) estuary, the appearance of a frigate has been the only change in disposition which has been reported for some time.

The estimated disposition of the naval vessels of Communist China is given in the tabulation:

1 light cruiser (CL)	Last reported at Hu-lu-tao in 1949, rolled over on her side as a result of Nationalist China bombing.
3 gunboats (PG)	Tsingtao
3 old gunboats (OPG)	Shanghai
8 frigates (PF)	7 at Tsingtao, 1 at Canton/Whampoa
1 escort (corvette) (PCE)	Tsingtao
4 sub chasers (PCS)	Canton/Whampoa
40 motor torpedo boats (PT)	12 at T'ang-ku, 10 at Tsingtao, 13 at Shanghai, 5 at Canton/Whampoa
16 river gunboats (PR)	14 on the Yangtze, 2 on the Pearl River
1 minesweeper, coastal (AMC)	*n a* (possibly Shanghai or north)
12 landing ships, tank (LST)	6 at Tsingtao, 3 at Canton/Whampoa, 3 *n a* (possibly Shanghai or north)
13 landing ships, medium (LSM)	6 at Shanghai (fitted as minelayers), 4 at Canton/Whampoa, 3 *n a* (possibly Shanghai or north)
16 landing ships, infantry (LSI)	5 at Shanghai (fitted as mine sweepers), 4 at Canton/Whampoa, 7 *n a* (possibly Shanghai or north)
4 landing craft, utility (LCU)	3 at Shanghai, 1 at Canton/Whampoa
2 survey ships (AGS)	*n a* (possibly Shanghai or north)
5 cargo ships, light (AKL)	3 at Tsingtao, 2 at Shanghai
1 repair ship, landing craft (ARL)	Shanghai

In addition, the Navy has at least a hundred small ships which can be designated YP (Service Craft, Patrol Vessels), and may have additional river gunboats (PR) on the Sungari River. The number of amphibious types would be doubled if those landing vessels now employed as cargo carriers by the Chinese Communists were to be turned over to naval control. The Navy also has at its disposal hundreds of armed junks, sampans, and other small craft which can be utilized for coastal surveillance, limited amphibious lifts, and minelaying.

It is difficult to ascribe any particular strategic significance to the present disposition of Chinese Communist naval units; undoubtedly, such practical considerations as fueling and repair facilities figure prominently in the assignment of vessels. The waters along the coast of Fukien province (East China Region), including the former Nationalist naval bases of Foochow (Fu-chou) and Amoy (Hsia-men), are apparently avoided (except for inshore patrols by light forces), probably because of their proximity to Taiwan and to coastal islands still in Nationalist hands, such as Chin-men Tao (commonly known as Quemoy). A base in the Chou-shan Ch'ün-tao (to which, according to rumor, some Shanghai vessels would be moved) would provide a protected point from which to conduct actions against these Nationalist-held islands, and would also reduce the present vulnerability to foreign observation. The presence of the twelve

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

. torpedo boats sighted at T'ang-ku, far re-
ved from any other known Communist Chinese
al forces, may perhaps be explained as new ac-
sitions – constructed in local yards, transported
rail from an unknown origin, or delivered to the
inese by Soviet naval elements at Port Arthur
i-shun) or Dairen. There is a possibility that
ng-ku was merely a transshipment point, as the
st recent observers there have not reported the
lve PT boats.

. Personnel

t is impossible to obtain any firm figure on the
inese Communist Navy's personnel strength.
til 1949 there were no recognizable navy and no
al personnel as such. Since that time the
inese Communists have rapidly created a naval
ce, and it is conservatively estimated that by
y 1952 there were 25,000 personnel in naval
vice, plus the 30,000 marines. At present there
unsufficient evidence upon which to formulate
y sort of breakdown into ashore-and-afloat or
cers-and-enlisted categories.

The greatest number of personnel are stationed
hin a radius of 300 miles of Shanghai. Tsingtao
s the second largest group, and Canton/
ampoa is third. Other members of the Navy
scattered rather thinly along the coast and
igable rivers.

Policy and doctrine

. Naval strategic concepts

The political, economic, and military circum-
nces prevalent during the first few years of the
stence of the Chinese People's Republic have
itated against the forming of naval concepts
ich were not primarily defensive in nature. The
ncipal maritime effort has been directed towards
creation of a navy capable of 1) defending
ina's seaward flank, and 2) guarding against
authorized movements of persons, information,
goods via Chinese waters. To these two funda-
ntal requirements, the military high command
s added a third injunction of a special and tem-
ary nature: the Navy must be prepared to con-
ct offensive amphibious operations, transporting
ge numbers of Army troops over short distances.
sumably, the purpose of such assaults would
to seize Taiwan and the remaining Nationalist-
ld offshore islands; if the venture proved suc-
sful, amphibious operations would probably then
de-emphasized.

The political factor is apparent in the Navy's
e as the nautical exponent of the iron-curtain
ncept. In the totalitarian philosophy of the Chi-
se Communist government, complete domination
the political thinking of the people and virtual isolation from all non-Communist outside influences are essential goals. A primary function of the Navy is to provide a network of coastal patrols to prevent the infiltration of alien ideas and enemy agents.*

Naval planning has been very distinctly influenced by the state of the Chinese economy. The relatively primitive state of the nation's heavy industry has precluded any possibility of a native construction program aimed at building a seagoing fleet capable of meeting a Western navy on somewhat near equal terms. Lacking the industrial facilities to construct sizable warships, China has turned to the employment of large numbers of small, lightly-armed, short-ranged craft. Most of the vessels in this category are no more than slow-moving converted junks used for coastal patrolling; however, the Chinese Communists are also developing a fleet of high-speed motor torpedo boats for hit-and-run actions. These boats are tactically offensive, but their strategic employment will remain defensive. Although the Soviet Navy could conceivably transfer some coastal submarines to the Chinese Communist Navy, as well as additional frigates and motor torpedo boats, it is not believed that such an increase in the size of the fleet could alter the existing defensive concept of naval power.

The geographic realities of China's present military situation also lend themselves to a naval strategy essentially defensive in character. With the exception of Taiwan, Communist China has no practical fields for military aggression to the seaward. The nearest potential target, the Republic of the Philippines, lies 400 nautical miles to the southeast, and cannot be overtly attacked without Chinese control of the intervening sea. Since on the one hand the mastery of these waters is beyond their capabilities, and on the other hand Southeast Asia and India are open to their exploitation without naval forces, the Chinese Communists have probably never considered their Navy as an instrument of aggression in itself.

From the outset, the naval staff members under the Chinese Communist military high command have had to accomplish their tasks under adverse circumstances. When they began actively to build a navy in 1949, Communist China had no fleet other than a few small ships which, with their crews, had defected from the Nationalists. The basic personnel force of the Navy consisted solely

* Assigning this sort of security duty to the Navy proper, is a departure from the practices of other Communist nations, who usually have employed special quasi-naval forces under the state's security agency for this purpose – for example, the MGB Navy of the Soviet Union, the *Grenzpolizei Nord* of East Germany.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

of these dubious Nationalist deserters. It was necessary to build and improvise such ships as were within the industrial capabilities, screen and indoctrinate the ex-Nationalist officers and men, and then embark on a hurried program to train large numbers of Communist naval personnel. Such former Nationalist naval officers as Teng Chao-hsiang* were used in important command and training posts until veteran Communists could be trained as replacements. The lack of strong naval leaders who enjoyed the full confidence of the government was yet another contributing factor to the existing naval situation.

The problem of providing some semblance of an organized defense of China's maritime frontiers severely taxes the resources of this heterogeneous and somewhat makeshift young navy. Acting alone, it could not defend the coast against an attack by a light task force of a Western navy. This fact must be evident to the Chinese Communist military leaders, and it can be concluded that the actual mission which they have assigned to the Navy in this respect is merely to assist the Army in the defense of the Chinese coast. This limited mission stands as a further explanation of the nearly universal subordination of the Navy to the Army in the over-all military organization.

The ability of the Navy to accomplish its three assignments (coast defense, maritime security, and amphibious operations) varies considerably. As stated previously, the Chinese Communist Navy could not turn a determined attack from the sea; however, it can certainly be anticipated that normal sea lanes along the coast and the approaches to river mouths and principal ports will be heavily mined. Events in Korea have shown that the Communists are capable of using almost any sort of vessel (including junks) for successful minelaying operations. In addition, some damage may be inflicted on enemy surface units by the motor torpedo boats or (possibly) by stationary torpedo launchers on shore. The task of maintaining a security patrol to control all movements of personnel or materiel in Chinese waters is being discharged with an ever greater degree of success. There is already a thin net of patrols (mostly motorized junks) covering the inshore areas, and as more junks are built or converted and more crews trained, these maritime police functions may eventually succeed in sealing off the whole frontier.

The troop lift capacity of the Navy, using only those conventional amphibious vessels which are currently under naval control, has been estimated at roughly 60,000 men; however, the Navy's landing ships and landing craft represent only a fraction of the total troop-carrying potential of Communist China. By employing the similar amphibious types now engaged in cargo-carrying, and the thousands of junks and small craft, plus the vessels of the merchant marine, the Chinese Communists could mount an invasion force of roughly a million men for an objective fairly close at hand. The Navy would be very hard-pressed if it were called upon to direct such an undertaking, even if there were no appreciable naval opposition.

2. Doctrine

Whatever doctrine the present Chinese Communist Navy possesses has been largely determined by the military history of the regime, the composition of the forces afloat, and the training and advisory services of the Soviets.

The conquest of the mainland from the Kuomintang was achieved by the Army, most of the party leaders have served in the Army, and moreover, all of the senior naval officers either were, or concurrently are, officers of the People's Liberation Army. The Navy has come late into the picture and has no tradition and no experienced, influential leadership. Against such a background, it was inevitable that when a naval force was being formed in 1949 the prevailing concept was that of creating a specialized, supporting arm for the ground forces.

Even if this strong Army influence had not been present, naval doctrine would have been more or less land-bound in nature by the composition of the fleet. Since so much of the strength afloat is made up of large numbers of converted small craft and minor patrol vessels (a situation which is likely to prevail for some time) the development of naval tactics has been limited to those close inshore functions which are within the capabilities of such vessels. In view of the dissimilar types employed, the primitive communications procedures, and the varying degrees of proficiency among crews, it can be assumed that this doctrine is rather informal and flexible.

Soviet advisers and instructors in various operational commands and training centers are introducing appropriate methods of the Soviet Navy into the Chinese Communist naval organization wherever applicable. The Soviet emphasis on minelaying can find particularly felicitous expression in China's coastal waters. Coast defense and amphibious doctrine are also likely to bear strong Soviet influence.

Specific points stressed in the book of naval doctrine include 1) procedures to be followed in short-haul amphibious operations, and 2) measures for defending the China coast with existing materiel, making maximum usage of geographic features.

---

* Commanding Officer of the *Chungking* at the time she defected, Teng reportedly held several high positions in the Chinese Communist Navy during 1949–1950. He was last reported as being under house arrest in January 1952.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

.ultitudinous bays, islands, and points of land ch mark the coast of China are ideally suited to use of motor torpedo boats, mines, and such less nodox means of naval warfare as shorebased pedo launchers. However, even in the open sea, ws of small patrol vessels have not hesitated to n fire on United Nations or United States air- ft operating in their vicinity. Apparently there standing orders to engage any foreign military ts sighted, regardless of range and regardless dds.

'he vast number of junks makes possible inten- patrolling through China's confined coastal ers, and these difficult-to-sink craft, equipped h 75-mm field pieces, recoilless rifles, antitank is, and other unusual naval armament, can be prisingly formidable when massed in numbers inst the smaller types of conventional warships. a further possibility, the influence of Oriental l totalitarian callousness towards the lives of in- duals, combined with Communist fanaticism, ikely to lead to the use of suicide tactics and al adaptations of the "human sea" assaults.

. Naval budget and appropriations

'he Chinese Communist military budget for 1952 been reported as 3 billion United States dollars one instance, and as 2.6 billion United States lars in another. Naval allocations are believed comprise only about four to five percent of the l military budget. Even if one of the two re- ted sums were confirmed, it would not neces- ily reveal the true fiscal situation of the Navy. s not known to what extent the Navy is finan- ly responsible for the coastal security patrols l vessels attached to the Army, nor to what de- e the naval organization may be supported goods and services charged to other functions he government. There is no information as to adequacy of the naval budget, but it can be sumed that the government's allocation of ds for over-all military expenditures will con- ue at the maximum rate; if the Navy has the essary priority, adequate funds will be forth- ning.

. Construction and development programs

lthough definite information on the subject of al shipbuilding is not available, there is con- erable evidence that such construction is going in Communist China. Six motor torpedo boats e reportedly sighted in various stages of con- uction at Tsingtao, and rumors persist that all, fast boats are being turned out for the Navy Whampoa. Kiangnan Naval Dockyard (Shang-) was supposedly working on a project of twelve foot patrol vessels in 1952, and it is believed that ne of this class were observed undergoing trials at 12 to 14 knots. Undoubtedly, the forces afloat are being steadily increased in number by the addition of newly constructed junks; however, the questions of how many and from what origins cannot be answered. In all of these construction efforts, it is very probable that China must look to the U.S.S.R. for the supply of high-speed engines, armaments, electronic gear, and other like items requiring a high degree of technical competence for their production.

The modernization and conversion work in progress for the Chinese Communist Navy can only be roughly estimated by the observation of various ships. During 1950–1951 some of the frigates and the gunboat, *Kuang Chou,* were rearmed with Soviet guns and were fitted with radar. Other modifications of these vessels could have occurred at the same time. The ex-British Flower Class corvette was reportedly reconverted into a warship from her merchant status in 1950–1951. During the same period at least six units of the LSM group were converted to minelayers and some LSI were adapted for minesweeping. Other vessels of the LSM and LST categories were reportedly refitting and being rearmed at Shanghai in late 1952. Also, a considerable number of smaller amphibious craft either have been or are being reconditioned at that port. As in the case of new construction, improvements to existing vessels can be accomplished only if the Soviets continue to meet the naval material requirements of the Chinese Communists.

The development of the physical plant of the naval shore establishment has not been the subject of much reliable, confirmed reporting. There were several rumors of extensive improvements to be made in the port facilities of Yü-lin on the island of Hainan (Hai-nan Tao), but such rumors have not been substantiated. At the time of Hainan's capture by the Communist forces, it was speculated that Yü-lin was to become the main naval base for all of Central and South China; this situation may possibly be realized at some future date. In addition, work may be in progress in the Chou-shan Ch'ün-tao, preparing a naval base for the "fleet" now based at Shanghai.

5. Naval relationships with other countries

The relationship of the Chinese Communist Navy with the Navy of the U.S.S.R. is, of course, very close. Few facts are known about the agreements between the two nations concerning naval matters, but the extent to which the Chinese rely upon the Soviets for naval knowledge and technical materiel can be easily deduced. Soviet advisers are found throughout the Chinese naval organization, including the Naval Headquarters at Peiping, and Soviet instructors apparently guide the training efforts of all the Chinese Communist naval schools and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

academies. Naval ordnance, electronics gear, and other technical equipment, as well as petroleum, come almost entirely from the U.S.S.R.

Among the few specific bits of information available regarding naval agreements between the two countries are the Communist-released texts of the treaties of 14 February 1950 and 16 September 1952. The former provided for joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur with the defense works to be transferred to the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet troops removed after "conclusion of a Sino-Soviet peace treaty with Japan," but not later than the end of 1952. Until the Soviet withdrawal, military affairs in the Port Arthur region were to be conducted by a Sino-Soviet United Military Commission. In the 1952 treaty, according to Communist releases, the Chinese "requested" the Soviets to remain in Port Arthur because the situation in the Far East is "dangerous for peace and favorable for the repetition of Japanese aggression." The U.S.S.R. agreed to remain.

The great commercial port of Dairen was also made a joint port (under Chinese administration) according to the 1950 treaty. Final determination of the status of Dairen is to be made after the "conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty."

This intimacy with the Soviet Union undoubtedly has a considerable influence on naval planning, although some of the most important aspects of this relationship cannot at present be observed. It is logical, however, to assume that 1) schemes have been worked out whereby certain of the Chinese naval bases will be available to Soviet submarines in time of a major war, and that 2) the disparity between the Soviet and Chinese Navies in large-ship strength would be such as to relegate the Chinese forces to auxiliary and supplementary functions.

In a war in which the two nations would operate overtly as allies, it is probable that the Chinese would be responsible for minelaying and patrolling along their own coast, and for such defensive hit-and-run attacks as can be executed by motor torpedo boats. It is also very likely that the Soviets would transfer small coastal submarines to the Chinese Communist Navy. In turn, the Chinese, using their naval and commercial landing ships and other transport vessels, could appreciably supplement the Soviet amphibious lift capacity in the Far East.

All nations outside the Communist bloc are considered potential enemies, but the nations whose navies are foremost in the minds of the Chinese Communist planners are: 1) the Chinese Nationalists, with whom they have been fighting for many years; 2) the Japanese, of whom they have a traditional fear; and 3) the United States, Great Britain, and France, who have, in the order listed, the most formidable non-Communist navies in the western Pacific. The Chinese Communists can conceive of eventually defeating the Nationalist Navy in open combat, but the potential Japanese Navy is an unknown factor, and the three great Western Navies can be struck at only by mines and hit-and-run torpedo attacks or by air power.

6. National attitude toward the Navy

In any totalitarian state the national attitude finds only one expression, the official one. Thus, in Communist China there are no political parties or groups with overtly differing attitudes regarding the importance and functions of the Navy. The leaders of the Chinese Government have all had Army experience. Their naval thinking is conditioned by this fact and by Soviet influence, as well as by the geographic realities of their situation. As a result, the nation is not navy-minded. Although the propaganda and prestige value of a navy is not ignored, the Navy remains in a subordinate position in the national thinking.

There is no evidence that Navy personnel, as a group, have any appreciable influence in the formulation of government policies.

E. Personnel

1. Corps, services, ranks, and rates

Information on the corps and services within the Chinese Communist naval organization is too fragmentary and contradictory to be accepted as authoritative. It can be assumed that eventually the Soviet system may be employed for dividing personnel into specialist groups with distinctive titles and designators.

Beyond the fact that the Chinese Communist naval personnel force is divided into officer and enlisted components, with a distinctive uniform for each, there is practically nothing else known of personnel organization. There is no positive information on the breakdown of ranks and rates, and the fact that insignia of grade are not worn makes it difficult to arrive at a pattern inductively.

2. Personnel procurement

All of the personnel of the Chinese Communist Navy are probably "volunteers," although in many cases the "volunteering" may have been done under various sorts of pressure.

The highest ranking naval officers are all former generals of the Chinese Communist Army; in the middle ranks, some are ex-Army, some are former Nationalist Navy officers, and some are Communist career naval personnel either trained by the Soviets or trained under Soviet supervision in the relatively new Chinese Communist naval schools. These Chinese schools provide most of the junior officers. The qualifications required of officer candidates and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

...ethods used to obtain specialist personnel are ... known.

The enlisted personnel have come from two main ...rces; 1) fishermen and small-craft sailors, and Army transferees. The present trend is to place ...re stress upon past education and evidence of ...icability rather than upon sea experience. The ...horities have found that a high school student ...fair intelligence is more likely to make a good ...al rating than is an illiterate – even though sea- ...e – fisherman.

There is no information available on the condi- ...ns of service under which officers and enlisted ...sonnel are procured, nor is there any accurate ...cription of living conditions within the Navy.

3. Naval uniforms and insignia

The naval uniforms conform to those in general ... among the world's navies. The officers wear ...mmer whites cut much like United States Navy ...ites, and their winter blues and work blues are ...ort of faded grey-blue, with the high Chinese ...lar, and are probably made of cotton. Recent ...otographs of enlisted uniforms show a strong ...viet flavor, with the horizontally-striped under- ...rt, long hat streamers, and wide belt.

So far as can be ascertained, neither enlisted ...sonnel nor officers wear any insignia of rank ...rate, but a few observers have made vague ref- ...nces to seeing "a captain" or "an officer with ...d braid." It is possible that on liberty or on ...cial occasions some sort of rank insignia are ...rn.

Reserve and mobilization system

The Chinese Communists do not have a Naval ...serve in the accepted sense of the term. The fact ...t the Navy is now larger than it has ever been ... its short history, and is continually expanding, ...cludes the possibility of having a surplus of ...ined personnel or armed vessels available to form ...eserve.

On the other hand, since a large part of the ...vy's vessel strength is composed of armed junks ...d other adapted native craft, some augmentation ... personnel strength can come from the swarms ... fishermen and seamen whose craft ply the ...stal waters of China. Many of these skilled op- ...tors of small craft have been given courses in ...itical indoctrination, and some of them have ...en conscripted for short periods of duty to take ...rt in amphibious maneuvers. In a sense these ...men constitute a reserve of several hundred ...usand who can be mobilized rather quickly; but ...ey do not have the technical skills needed to ...ve on the orthodox ships of the Navy. In the ...me manner, some of the ships and junks engaged ... commercial pursuits could be commandeered by the Navy, but such vessels would probably lack armament and proper communications gear.

G. Training

1. General

The training program of the Chinese Communist Navy is a widespread development designed to provide loyal Communist crewmen for everything from sampans to submarines. Loyalty to the regime being a *sine qua non,* a great deal of stress is placed on political indoctrination, and courses in political science and history appear in all the curricula. Some of the two- or three-week training courses for fishermen and junk crews consist almost totally of political propaganda. It is probable that the efficiency of naval training is sometimes inhibited by the diversion of so much time and energy to political considerations, but on the other hand, there is some evidence that the program does have positive value in producing a large number of loyal fanatics. This extreme emphasis on loyalty, coupled with the severity of potential punishment, may restrict original thinking and freedom to criticize, but it does not remove the incentive to get results.

To date, the Chinese Communists have not taken part in a major naval engagement which would make possible an objective evaluation of the efficacy of their training program. In their biggest operation to date – the invasion of Hainan – they did not employ any of their orthodox naval craft. In this engagement, however, it was apparent that the junk crews, whether Army or Navy, were courageous and well disciplined.

The number of personnel under training at any given time is difficult to estimate, not only because of the paucity of information but also because it is difficult to define "naval training" under the Chinese Communist system. One approach is to include under the term such items as the Army-conducted amphibious maneuvers with conscripted junks and crews, the training of Army junk patrols, and the two- or three-week indoctrination courses held for fishermen. Another concept is to apply "naval training" only to these complete courses given in the schools and academies to prepare officers and seamen for general naval service. Using the conservative definition and the most conservative figures, the minimum number of officers and men completing training during any one year can be placed at 5,000. With the broadest definition and a more liberal use of the available figures, the total under training becomes several times that number.

Until five years ago the military experience of the Chinese Communists was restricted entirely to ground army operations. Consequently, they have

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

no naval tradition or experienced naval personnel to form the basis for a naval training program. A number of experienced naval officers and ratings were acquired by defections from the Nationalist Chinese Navy, but the Communists do not put much trust in these ex-Nationalists, and generally use them only under close supervision. The result of this lack of naval background has been that the Navy has been forced to rely very heavily upon the U.S.S.R. to provide advisers, technicians, and instructors for naval training. There are probably several Soviet representatives at each Chinese Communist naval training station, and they have been seen in considerable numbers at such major training centers as Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao). A few selected Army officers were probably given naval training in the Soviet Union during the late 1940's, and there is some evidence that this practice continues; however, confirmation must await further reporting.

2. Training facilities

Training facilities range from fairly modern plants acquired from the Nationalists (some built with United States aid and advice) to mere beaches and bays, suitable for amphibious maneuvers and the training of junk patrols. About 55 training centers have been reported, but the actual number is held to be somewhat less than that. Those centers which can be named with reasonably surety are shown in FIGURE 82–4.

3. Training afloat

Some reports have stated that new recruits in the Chinese Communist Navy receive little but political indoctrination and an introduction to military life in the schools ashore; naval training is conducted almost exclusively aboard ship. This situation did seem to exist in the first two or three years, as a great deal of very elementary training apparently took place in vessels alongside, with such vessels getting underway only at rare intervals. In at least one instance, certain ex-Nationalist sailors and ex-merchant marine personnel in the Communist naval organization reportedly expressed dissatisfaction at a system which tied up available vessels for fundamental seamanship classes, at the expense of underway training. In the past year, however, there have been good indications that Chinese Communist naval units are putting to sea whenever possible, and in the autumn of 1952 there were frequent reports of operations by the frigates out of Tsingtao.

Reports of specific operating exercises have included frequent references to motor torpedo boat maneuvers (including night formation practice), minesweeping practice in the Yangtze River estuary and the Chou-shan Ch'ün-tao (islands) area,

FIGURE 82–4. KNOWN TRAINING FACILITIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY

LOCATION	NUMBER OF STUDENTS*	TYPES OF TRAINING
NORTHEAST DISTRICT:		
Dairen	200	Submarine
	750	General
Ying-k'ou	150	General
Hu-lu-tao	100	Officers
NORTH DISTRICT:		
Tientsin	150	Officers
T'ang-ku	300	General
EAST DISTRICT:		
Chefoo	150	General
Tsingtao	1,000	Various specialties and officer training
Nanking	750	General
Ch'ung-ming Tao	Fluctuates	Amphibious
Shanghai-Wu-sung	1,250	Radar, minelaying and sweeping, torpedo, and general
CENTRAL AND SOUTH DISTRICT:		
Swatow	250	Amphibious and navigation
Ta-ya Wan (Bias Bay)	200	Motor mechanics, coastal patrols
Whampoa	750	Specialists schools and general
Yü-lin	100	Coastal patrols

* These figures are based on inadequate and conflicting data. They are included as indicators of the relative importance of the various centers and not as absolute numbers.

and submarine training under Soviet direction at Dairen and (possibly) Port Arthur. In the amphibious exercises conducted by the Army, naval participation can run from furnishing a few key members for the crews of transport junks to providing a full-scale (by Chinese Communist standards) support group utilizing all available orthodox warships.

H. Logistics

1. Procurement

The procurement system employed by the Chinese Communist Navy is not known. Because of the physical, economic, and political difficulties involved in getting supplies from the U.S.S.R., the Chinese Communists undoubtedly are making great efforts to produce for themselves every naval item within their capabilities and to increase these capabilities. Regardless of all efforts to develop domestic sources of supply, however, the Chinese Navy remains almost entirely dependent upon the Soviets and their European Satellites for all specialized items of naval hardware and for petroleum products.

2. New construction, repair and maintenance

There is no way of determining the policy in effect for the construction of naval vessels in Com-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 963343
By JW NARA Date 9/22/10

...ia. As stated previously, the only naval ...ding noted under the Communist regime ...een in the categories of motorized junks and ...ll patrol vessels, with some recent evidence of ...or torpedo boat production. The extent of ...se programs cannot be estimated, as there are ...ny possible points of origin which have not been ...erved for some time. Presumably, the supply ...ngines and armaments would be the only limit- ...factor in a wholesale expansion of this "splinter ...t."

...iangnan Naval Dockyard (Shanghai) is prob- ...y the most important shipbuilding and repair ...lity in Communist China; however, the instal- ...ons at Port Arthur and Dairen are also of great ...erest to the Chinese Communist Navy. Kiang- ... is supposedly producing patrol vessels for ...stal work, and the yards at Dairen and Port ...hur may have performed the overhauls and ...rations on Communist China's major combat- ...s. Whampoa has turned out some naval junks ...ch received armor, armaments, and engines in ...same locale. In addition to these sizeable yards ...e are numerous small plants which can con- ...ct small craft and handle most minor repairs. ...e SECTION 64 for a fuller description of both ...or and minor facilities.)

...here is no pattern in the sightings of Chinese ...mmunist warships to suggest a cycle of routine ...haul periods. The nature of the fleet would ...n to indicate that continual repairs would be ...uired to keep units in even minimum operating ...dition. Reports thus far have been contradic- ... on this subject.

... Centers of supply

... is certain that there are naval supply depots ...er at or near the four main naval centers: ...ren, Tsingtao, Shanghai-Wu-sun, and Wham- ... All four of these centers are accessible by ...road and highway as well as by seagoing ships, ... in or near large centers of population which ...e good supplies of skilled (by Chinese stand- ...s) industrial workers, and have combined stor- ... facilities more than ample for the actual needs ...he Navy.

...watow (Shan-t'ou) (23°22'N, 116°40'E) and ...g-hai (30°02'N, 122°06'E) are secondary bases, ... there are a number of other ports which may ... be in this category. Among these are Ying- ...i (40°40'N, 122°17'E), Ta-ku-T'ang-ku (38°59'N, ...°41'E), Chefoo (Yen-t'ai) (37°32'N, 121°24'E), ...i-hai-wei (37°30'N, 122°06'E), Lien-yün ...°44'N, 119°27'E), Nanking (Nan-ching) ...°03'N, 118°47'E), Yin-hsien (29°53'N, 121°33'E), ...nchow (Yung-chia) (28°01'N, 120°39'E), and ...ya Wan (22°37'N, 114°40'E).

It must be remembered that both the primary and the secondary bases are termed such only in the context of the Chinese naval situation; all are relatively primitive by Western standards.

I. Ship design and characteristics

1. Design of ships

There has been no known construction of sizeable naval vessels in China for twenty years; therefore, all of Communist China's relatively modern warships are of foreign origin. The ex-British light cruiser, *Chungking,* would be a very formidable fighting unit against the navies of other Far East nations if she were to be returned to operating condition. Although rumors are numerous and persistent, the present status of this vessel continues to be unknown. The eight ex-Japanese frigates may all now be rearmed with what is thought to be Soviet 3.9-in/56 dual-purpose guns, and these vessels have also received radar. Most of the frigates were hastily constructed in the closing days of World War II, and they probably reflect the shortages of materials and the inferior workmanship which characterized the last stages of Japanese war production. Russian guns have also been mounted aboard the ex-corvette of the Castle Class. This ship's new 5.1-inch weapons have caused her to be reclassified as a gunboat.

The river gunboats of the Chinese Communist Navy are representative of the types which have patrolled the inland waterways of the Far East for half a century. Fitting out amphibious vessels as minecraft has been attempted in other navies and was a logical development for the Chinese in view of their emphasis on mine warfare.

Junks can be divided by function and size into cargo, fishing, and river junks; within these categories are many local variations. Large, ocean-going junks measure up to 200 feet in length, and range up to 400 tons in displacement; the measurements of the average vessel, however, probably do not exceed 70 feet and 150 tons. Motorized junks have been known to be powered by three diesel engines with speeds up to 16 knots, but again, the normal arrangement is one engine and 6 or 7 knots speed. Sailing junks often have an auxiliary diesel or gasoline engine.

Some of these craft have been armored with concrete and steel plate gun emplacements. The armament found aboard naval junks is often quite unorthodox and may be quickly removable for use on land. One vessel was observed with an ex-Japanese field-type 75-mm howitzer mounted in the bow. The weapon was capable of elevation but not train, making it necessary to change the heading of the ship to effect a change in train.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 72 547
By JL NARA Date 1/22/75

2. Strategic characteristics

The strategic characteristics of Chinese Communist naval vessels are given in FIGURE 82–5.

J. Materiel

1. General

The guns of the Chinese Communist Navy are all of foreign origin, are obsolescent, and incorporate little in the way of modern fire control equipment. Primarily, naval firepower consists of the guns found on the ex-Japanese naval vessels, but there are also many of United States manufacture, some British, and scattered representatives of various other nations. The effectiveness of the weapons (especially with regard to antiaircraft fire) cannot be considered high, and the problems of maintenance prevent their remaining at peak performance. Because of the lack of United States and Japanese parts, in particular, equipment can be maintained at a satisfactory level only through the transfer and cannibalization of equipment from inoperative vessels. An increase in the number of vessels rearmed with U.S.S.R. guns can be expected as a remedy. Supplies of spare parts and ammunition for the miscellaneous collection of guns are very low, and increased dependence upon the U.S.S.R. for ammunition and associated equipment is indicated.

The Chinese Communists are not believed to have any mines or torpedoes of native design; however, since the Chinese have long been proficient in the art of improvising, it can be expected that mines fabricated from almost any type of buoyant container filled with explosive may be encountered in rivers and coastal waterways. Thus far the primary source of underwater weapons has been the World War II stocks of Japanese mines and torpedoes which are still available in China. In addition, it is expected that the Soviets will provide mines and torpedoes in sufficient quantities to fill major requirements.

The Chinese Communist Navy is equipped with several ex-United States and ex-Japanese radars as well as at least one type of Soviet gear. There has been no evidence of a native Chinese design in use by the fleet. Performance of existing equipment is considerably below Western standards, as maintenance is handicapped by inexperienced technicians and a shortage of spare parts.

For ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications the Chinese have available a myriad of equipments of various national origins. Low, medium, and high frequency equipments should be available in sufficient numbers to meet satisfactorily the requirements of naval communications. Although no confirmed evidence of VHF antenna installation has been reported, sufficient equipments are probably available in China to permit utilization of the 100–150 megacycle region if such were desired for the Navy. The problem of maintenance, although not so severe as with radar gear, undoubtedly plagues the naval forces and must result in an inordinate amount of "down time."

2. Materiel characteristics

Chinese Communist Navy guns and their characteristics are shown in FIGURE 82–6.

The Chinese are known to have limited quantities of Japanese World War II torpedoes undergoing overhaul in Shanghai. These include an 18-inch type and a 21-inch type, whose exact designations have not been determined. The 18-inch torpedo is probably the Type 91 aircraft torpedo, which had a range of 2,200 yards at 42 knots and carried a war head varying in weight from 330 pounds to 900 pounds. This torpedo was dropped by the Japanese from an altitude of 330 feet at a speed of 180 knots. The 21-inch torpedo could be the Type 89, Type 92, or Type 95, all of which are fired by an impact type exploder mechanism.

The U.S.S.R. could provide Communist China with surface, aircraft, or submarine torpedoes of various capabilities. For example, the Soviets gave the North Koreans the Type 53–38 21-inch torpedo. While of a somewhat obsolescent design, this torpedo is a formidable weapon fully capable of performing its mission. It utilizes both transverse and whisker-type impact exploder mechanisms.

The exact types and designations of the Japanese mines available to the Chinese are not known, but probably the majority are the Type 93, which was the most widely used Japanese World War II moored mine. This mine is actuated by contact with chemical horns and contains an explosive charge of approximately 220 pounds; it can be laid in depths of 3,000 feet. Controlled mines, both moored and ground, may also be encountered.

It can be expected that all of the Russian mines encountered by the United Nations forces in Korea would again be met in the hands of the Chinese. In addition, it must be assumed that any, or all, known types of Russian mines will appear. It is also reasonable to assume that the quantities of Russian mines that will be given to the Chinese will exceed by far the quantities shipped into Korea.

In Korea, the U.S.S.R. provided the North Koreans and the Chinese Volunteers with three types of moored contact mines. Two of these were operational during World War II and the third, a small anti-boat mine, was a new type encountered only in Korea. In addition, limited numbers of a hitherto unknown type of magnetic-inducted ground mine were given to the North Koreans. These ground mines were laid in a mixed-field with moored contact mines, making the minesweeping problem more difficult for the United

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

forces. In view of experiences in North ea, it is believed that all of these mines will loubtedly be given to the Chinese Communists, it is probable that other influence types may appear. Such mines may be expected to in- le acoustic and combination type firing mech- sms and will probably be used in mixed fields much the same manner as in Korean waters. further their mining capabilities, the Chinese undoubtedly be provided with Russian anti- ep devices that can be rigged to the mines, obstructors which can be laid in a mine field.

. shipborne version of the U.S.S.R. Type Rus–2 ar is believed to be in use by the Chinese, but information has not been confirmed by photo- phic coverage. There has been no evidence to icate that the Soviets are supplying or planning upply any of the more efficient modern search or control radars in use in the Soviet Fleet. The ection of some Chinese Nationalist vessels and capture of others have provided the Chinese nmunist Navy with several ships equipped with rld War II United States and Japanese equip- nts. A summary of the characteristics of radar believed to be in use by the Chinese Commu- Navy follows:

TYPE NAME	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	FUNCTION	FREQUENCY
			mc
us-2	U.S.S.R.	Air Search	67–76
ype 2 MK 1 Mod 1	Japanese	Air Search	90–112
Type 3 MK 1 Mod 3	Japanese	Air Search	145–170
SG	U.S.	Surface Search	3,000
SF	U.S.	Surface Search	2,900–3,100
SO	U.S.	Surface Search	3,000

K. Personalities

Flag and ranking officers of the Chinese Communist naval organization are:

Commander in Chief	HSIAO Ching-kuang
Deputy Commander in Chief	LO Shun-ch'u
Chief of Staff	In doubt*
Political Commissar	LIU Tao-sheng
Commander of the Central and South China Military Area Naval Forces	FANG Ch'iang
Commander of the East China Military Area Naval Forces	YUAN Yeh-lieh

* CHOU Hsi-han has recently been reported in this billet, but the same report and others list him also as Commander of the 13th Army, in Yünnan, which is an unlikely location for one having concurrent duty as Chief of Staff of the Navy.

HSIAO, Ching-kuang, Commander in Chief of the People's Navy—Born in Ch'ang-sha, Hunan province, about 1901, Hsiao turned to Communism early in life. From 1919 to 1924 he studied at the Far Eastern Uni-

FIGURE 82–5. STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS

E	a. CLASS b. NO. IN CLASS	NAME	YEAR COMPL. (PLACE)	STD. DISPL.	a. LENGTH b. BEAM c. DRAFT	MAX. SPD.	FUEL a. TYPE b. CAP. (TONS)
				tons	*ft. in.*	*kts.*	
	a. ARETHUSA b. 1	CHUNGKING (ex-HMS AURORA)	1937 (U.K.)	5,460	a. 506 0 b. 51 0 c. 18 1	*n a*	a. Oil b. 1,115
	a. "Kaibokan No. 1" b. 2	CHI AN, SHEN YANG	1944 (Jap.)	745	a. 221 5 b. 27 6 c. 9 6	16.5 (*des*)	a. Diesel b. 106
	a. "Kaibokan No. 2" b. 4	CHI NAN, WU CHANG, CHANG SHA, SI AN	1944 (Jap.)	740	a. 228 0 b. 28 2 c. 10 0	17.5 (*des*)	a. Oil b. 240
	a. HASHIDATE b. 1	NAN CHANG	1941 (Jap.)	990	a. 264 0 b. 32 0 c. 9 0	20.1 (*des*)	a. Oil b. 179
	a. UKURU b. 1	HUI AN	1945 (Jap.)	940	a. 258 5 b. 25 9 c. 10 0	19.5 (*des*)	a. Diesel b. 120
	a. "Castle" b. 1	KUANG CHOU	1944 (U.K.)	1,060	a. 252 0 b. 36 8 c. 16 0	16.5	a. Oil b. 480
	a. Single ship b. 1	YUNG SUI	1929 (China)	600	a. 225 0 b. 30 0 c. 7 0	12	a. Coal b. *n a*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

versity at Moscow and then spent two years under Chiang Kai-shek (who in 1937 was to offer $25,000 for Hsiao's head) at the Whampoa Military Academy, which was then very leftist. When the Kuomintang broke with the Communists in 1927, Hsiao went to the Red Army Academy, remaining until 1931, at which time he became Commander of the Chinese Communist Seventh Army Group. He took part in the "Long March" and subsequently held several important military and political posts, becoming in 1945 the Deputy Commander of Lin Piao's Northeast United Democratic Army (later, the Northeast People's Liberation Army). In 1949 he held several different commands and political posts as the Communists moved southward. In January 1950, he became a reserve member of the CCP Central Committee, and in November 1950, Hsiao became Commander in Chief of the Navy.

LO, Shun-ch'u, Deputy Commander in Chief—The earliest available information on Lo is that in 1946 he was Chief of Staff of the Liaotung Field Army District and that he also served as Commander of the 48th Army. In 1951 some of his troops participated in the Korean War and in April of that year Lo was made Chief of Staff of the Navy. It was apparently in the summer of 1952 that he was promoted to Deputy Commander in Chief.

Lo was one of the advisers of the Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lai, the Communist Premier, on his visit to Moscow in August 1952 and was a guest at the dinner given by Stalin in honor of the Chinese delegation.

LIU, Tao-sheng, Political Commissar—The earliest information on Liu Tao-sheng is that in 1948 he was the Political Commissar of the 4th Military Subdistrict, Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Military Zone, Western Hopeh Military District, in the Chinese Communist military organization. He has been an active organizer and leader of various Chinese Communist youth organizations. He appears to have assumed his position in the Navy sometime prior to June 1951.

FANG, Ch'iang, Commander of the Central and South China Military Area Naval Forces—Fang is a veteran Red Army general, and at the time he was appointed to command the Central and South Navy he was in command of the 44th Army of the 4th Field Army, a post which he may still retain concurrently. Fang assumed his naval command late in 1951 or early in 1952, and his appointment appears to have had some connection with the removal at that time of ex-Nationalist Teng Chao-hsiang from the position of Deputy Commander of the Area Naval Command.

YUAN, Yeh-lieh, Commander of the East China Military Area Naval Forces—Yuan is a veteran Army man and was at one time commander of the 37th Army of the 4th Field Army. In 1947 he was concurrently commander of the 10th Column, East China People's Liberation Army and commander of the Pohai Military District. On 29 September 1948 the Tsinan Garrison Headquarters was established and Yuan was made 1st Deputy Commander under Yuan Chung-hsien. In December of 1948 the East China Military Area of the Chinese People's Liberation Army set up a Hsuchow Special Municipal Military Government, and Yuan was named a member of the committee and the city's garrison commander. Sometime in 1950 he became 2d Deputy Commander of the East China Naval Forces. In mid-May 1951, Yuan assumed his present command, replacing Chang Ai-p'ing.

L. Tabular data

The following Figures show characteristics of naval vessels and naval guns.

OF COMMUNIST CHINA NAVAL VESSELS

MAX. END.	ARMAMENT: Guns	ARMAMENT: a. Dpth. Chgs. b. Torp. Tubes c. Other	ELEC-TRONICS	CREW	REMARKS
kts./mi.					
16/3,450	6—6″ 8—4″ 8—40-mm 9—20-mm	a. 15 b. 6—21″ c. *none*	Radar Sonar	450	At last positive report (1949), on her side at Hulutao after Nat. China bombing, present status unknown.
14/6,500	2—4.7″ 12—AA MG	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	145	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy (1947).
14/4,500	2—3.9″/56 DP 3—45-mm 2—37-mm	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *none*	Radar	145	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy (1947).
14/3,460	3—4.7″ 9—AA MG	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *none*	Radar	170	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy (1947).
16/5,000	2—4.7″ 1—3.1″ 14—AA MG	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	150	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy (1947).
10/9,100	2—5.1″ 3—37-mm	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	100	Ex-Canadian corvette.
12/4,000	1—4.7″ 2—3.1″ 6—AA MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	152	

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

FIGURE 82–5

a. CLASS b. NO. IN CLASS	NAME	YEAR COMPL. (PLACE)	STD. DISPL.	a. LENGTH b. BEAM c. DRAFT	MAX. SPD.	FUEL a. TYPE b. CAP. (TONS)
			tons	*ft. in.*	*kts.*	
a. Single ship b. 1	MIN CHUAN	1929 (China)	464	a. 196 0 b. 26 0 c. 7 0	15	a. Coal b. 280
a. Single ship b. 1	AN TUNG	1920 (Jap.)	725	a. 235 0 b. 32 0 c. 8 0	11–14	a. *n a* b. *n a*
a. Single ship b. 1	YEN AN	1915 (China)	860	a. 215 0 b. 29 0 c. 12 0	13	a. Coal b. 156
a. Single ship b. 1	CHU TUNG	1907 (Jap.)	740	a. 200 0 b. 30 0 c. 8 0	10	a. Coal b. 150
a. "Flower" b. 1	*n a* (ex-HMS CLOVER)	1941 (U.K.)	1,060	a. 205 0 b. 33 0 c. 17 0	16	a. Oil b. 230
a. "U.S. 136'" b. 4	*n a*	WW II (U.S.)	277	a. 136 0 b. 24 6 c. 8 6	14	a. Diesel b. 30
a. (I and II) b. 39 (min.)	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	a. 70 0 (I) 40 0 (II) b. *n a* c. *n a*	*n a*	a. *n a* b. *n a*
a. *n a* b. 1	*n a* (ex-Nat. KUAI 102)	1936–37 (Ger.)	60	a. 92 0 b. 14 0 c. 5 0	30	a. Diesel b. *n a*
a. Fushimi b. 2	CHIANG FENG, CHIANG HSI	1940 (Jap.)	320	a. 165 0 b. 32 1 c. 5 0	15	a. Oil b. 68
a. *n a* b. 1	YING HAO	1933 (U.K.)	185	a. 160 0 b. 30 8 c. *n a*	11	a. Oil b. 26
a. *n a* b. 1	NAN CHIANG (ex-HMS FALCON)	1931 (U.K.)	372	a. 150 0 b. 28 9 c. 5 0	15	a. Oil b. 84
a. ATAMI b. 2	YUNG AN, YUNG PING	1930 (Jap.)	170	a. 148 0 b. 22 0 c. 5 0	12	a. Oil b. 53
a. *n a* b. 1	YING SHAN	1927 (U.K.)	310	a. 184 8 b. 28 0 c. 3 2	15	a. Oil b. 60
a. GUAM b. 2	MEI YUAN, TAI YUAN	1927 (China)	370	a. 159 5 b. 27 1 c. 6 0	12	a. Oil b. 75
a. HIRA b. 1	CH'ANG TE	1923 (Jap.)	305	a. 180 0 b. 27 0 c. *n a*	16	a. Coal b. 83
a. *n a* b. 1	FA KU	1921 (Fr.)	200	a. 179 0 b. 23 0 c. 5 0	14	a. Coal b. 44
a. *n a* b. 1	HO HSEUH	1911 (Jap.)	215	a. 180 0 b. 27 0 c. 4 0	9	a. Coal b. 80

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

(*Continued*)

MAX. END.	ARMAMENT: Guns	ARMAMENT: a. Dpth. Chgs. b. Torp. Tubes c. Other	ELECTRONICS	CREW	REMARKS
kts./mi.					
12/2,200	2—3.1″ 7—AA MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	119	
n a	2—3.1″ 10—MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	137	Served for many years as Yangtze River flagship with name ATAKA.
10/1,500	2—3″ 4—25-mm AA 6—13-mm AA 6—7.7-mm AA	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	Radar	*n a*	
9/900	2—3.1″ 8—AA MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	127	
10/5,000	*n a*	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	85	Converted into merchant vessel after WW II. Probably re-armed now.
10/2,200	1—3″ 2—40-mm 6—20-mm	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	33	Additional units in this class may be in Communist hands.
n a	1—MG (twin)	a. *n a* b. 2 c. *n a*	*n a*	*n a*	70′ boats similar to "Vosper" Class. Origins of all units unknown.
n a	*n a*	a. *n a* b. 2 c. *n a*	*n a*	14	Navy may have one other unit of this Class.
14/1,496	1—3.1″ 4—25-mm 1—13-mm 3—7.7-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	64	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy after WW II. Armament for CHIANG FENG may vary.
11/600	2—25-mm 2—13-mm 2—7.7-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	40	
15/2,250	2—57-mm 2—20-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	55	
9.8/800	1—47-mm 2—25-mm (twin) 3—25-mm (single) 2—13-mm 2—7.7-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	77	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy (1947).
15/2,250	2—3″ AA 8—MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	55	
n a	2—3″ 10—MG (MEI YUAN) 1—47-mm 3—25-mm 5—13-mm 2—7.7-mm (TAI YUAN)	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	70	Ex-U.S. Naval vessels presented to China in 1942.
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	62	Another unit, KATADA, may be in Chinese Communist hands. Allocated to China from Japanese Navy.
14/900	1—3″ 2—20-mm 4—MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	49	
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	86	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

FIGURE 82–5

'E	a. CLASS b. NO. IN CLASS	NAME	YEAR COMPL. (PLACE)	STD. DISPL.	a. LENGTH b. BEAM c. DRAFT	MAX. SPD.	FUEL a. TYPE b. CAP. (TONS)
				tons	*ft. in.*	*kts.*	
	a. *n a* b. 1	KIANG KUN	1921 (China)	180	a. 160 0 b. 25 0 c. *n a*	14	a. Oil b. 56
	a. *n a* b. 1	WU FENG	1909 (U.K.)	100	a. 120 0 b. 20 0 c. 2 0	10	a. Coal b. *n a*
	a. *n a* b. 2	TUNG HSIN, TUNG TEH	*n a* (*n a*)	500	a. *n a* b. *n a* c. *n a*	11–15	a. Coal b. *n a*
C	a. #1 b. 1	No. 201	1943 (Jap.)	215	a. 97 0 b. 18 0 c. 9 0	9.5	a. Diesel b. 105
'	a. "U.S. LST" b. 12	No. 16 and 258, CHING KANG SHAN, CHUNG-101, CHUNG-102, CHUNG-106, CHUNG-107, CHUNG-110, CHUNG-111, CHUNG-116, CHUNG-122, CHUNG-125	1944–45 (U.S.)	1,625	a. 328 0 b. 50 0 c. 11 0	10	a. Diesel b. 584
I	a. "U.S. LSM" b. 13	HUA-201, HUA-202, HUA-204, HUA-205, HUA-207, HUA-208, HUA-209, HUA-211, HUA-212 CHUAN SHIH SHUI, HUIA HO, HUANG HO, YUN HO	1945 (U.S.)	520	a. 204 0 b. 35 0 c. 7 0	13	a. Diesel b. 160
L	a. "U.S. LSIL" b. 16	MIN-301, MIN-303, MIN-306, MIN-311, MIN-312, MIN-313, MIN-319, MIN-321, MIN-325, MIN-331, CHU TIEN, KU CHOU, LIEN PI, YUNG KAN, KUEI HAI, KUO KAN	1943 (U.S.)	209	a. 159 0 b. 24 0 c. 6 0	14	a. Diesel b. 108
J	a. "U.S. LCT (MK 6)" b. 4	HO CHIEN HO YUNG CH'IUNG LIN One other, name *n a*	1944 (U.S.)	143	a. 119 0 b. 33 0 c. 4 0	10	a. Diesel b. 10
S	a. *n a* b. 1	CHUNG NING	*n a* (Jap.)	200	a. 115 0 b. 16 0 c. 6 0	10	a. *n a* b. *n a*
S	a. *n a* b. 1	FU TING	*n a*	160	a. 90 0 b. 20 0 c. 8 0	11	a. *n a* b. *n a*
L	a. U.S. Army FS Design No. 330 b. 4	*n a*	1944 (U.S.)	512	a. 170 0 b. 32 0 c. 9 0	10	a. Diesel b. 64
L	a. *n a* b. 1	TAH CHEN	*n a*	1,000	a. 175 0 b. *n a* c. *n a*	*n a*	a. *n a* b. *n a*
L	a. *n a* b. 1	HSING AN	1943 (U.S.)	4,080 (full load)	a. 328 0 b. 50 0 c. 14 0	10	a. Diesel b. 585

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45 337
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

(*Continued*)

MAX. END.	ARMAMENT: Guns	ARMAMENT: a. Dpth. Chgs. b. Torp. Tubes c. Other	ELEC-TRONICS	CREW	REMARKS
kts./mi.					
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	60	Former Italian ERMANNO CARLOTTO, seized by Japan in 1943, allocated to China at close of WW II.
n a	2—57-mm 2—MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	24	Formerly Portuguese MACAU, purchased by Japanese and renamed MAIKO. Allocated to China from Japanese Navy.
n a	1—3″ 4—47-mm 1—20-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	*n a*	Reported as sister ships, may be similar to GUAM Class.
9.5/1,700	1—40-mm 1—25-mm 2—13-mm 3—7.7-mm	a. *n a* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	*n a*	Allocated to China from Japanese Navy.
9/12,000	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	120	
12/3,500	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	58	At least six of these units have been fitted for minelaying.
7/4,000	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *n a*	*n a*	239	Some units may be fitted with minesweeping gear.
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	13	Additional units are probably in Chinese Communist hands.
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	*n a*	
n a	3—MG	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	25	
n a/4,000	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	22	
n a	*n a*	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	*n a*	Reportedly ex-U.S. supply vessel.
9/12,000	6—20-mm	a. *none* b. *none* c. *none*	*n a*	256	Former LST converted into ARL in U.S. Navy. Transferred to Nationalist China in 1948.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 45 333
By JW NARA Date 9/2/10

FIGURE 82–6. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL GUNS

INAL BORE CALIBER		MUZZLE VELOCITY	MAX. HORIZ. RANGE	MAX. ELEV.	MAX. VERT. RANGE	ROUNDS PER GUN PER MIN.	TYPE AMMO.	TYPE PROJ.	TYPE FUZE	WGT. PROJ.	MFG. OF BASIC TYPE	REMARKS
ı	*mm*	*ft per sec*	*yds*	*deg*	*ft*					*lbs*		
	152	2,700	24,200	45	*n a*	6	Bag	AP COM	PDF BDF	112	Gr.Br.	Aboard CL CHUNGKING, status unknown.
50	130	2,900	26,000	45	*n a*	10–11	Bag	AP COM HC	PDF BDF	60	U.S.S.R.	
ı a	120	2,600	17,000	50	*n a*	10–12	Semi-fixed	AP COM	PDF BDF	50	Jap.	
	102	2,650	19,400	80	38,000	12	Fixed	AA HC ILL	MTF ADF	31	Gr.Br.	Aboard CL CHUNGKING
56	100	2,950	23,200	85	41,000	12–15	Fixed	AA HC ILL	MTF PTF ADF	33	U.S.S.R.	
'n a	79	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*	Jap.	
	76.2	2,700	14,600	88	29,900	12–15	Fixed	AA	MTF BDF ADF	13	U.S.	
'60	40	2,890	11,000	90	22,800	160	Fixed	HC AP	PDF	1.98	U.S.	
'n a	25	2,978	7,000	85	16,500	175–200	Fixed	AP HC	PDF	0.9	Jap.	
'70	20	2,740	4,800	87	10,000	450	Fixed	HC AP	PDF	125 grams	U.S.	

ABBREVIATIONS

AP.....Armor Piercing
COM.....Common
HC.....High Capacity
AA.....Antiaircraft
AA COM..Antiaircraft Common
ILL.....Illuminating
PDF.....Point Detonating Fuze
BDF.....Base Detonating Fuze
ADF.....Auxiliary Detonating Fuze
MTF.....Mechanical Time Fuze
PTF.....Powder Train Time Fuze
VT.....Proximity